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Abstract.
CAESAR has caused a heated discussion regarding the merits of one-pass encryption
and online ciphers. The latter is a keyed, length preserving function which outputs
ciphertext blocks as soon as the respective plaintext block is available as input. The
immediacy of an online cipher affords a clear performance advantage, but it comes at
a price: ciphertext blocks cannot depend on later plaintext blocks, limiting diffusion
and hence security. We show how one can attain the best of both worlds by providing
provably secure constructions, achieving full cipher security, based on applications of
an online cipher around blockwise reordering layers.
Explicitly, we show that with just two calls to the online cipher, prp security up to
the birthday bound is both attainable and maximal. Moreover, we demonstrate that
three calls to the online cipher suffice to obtain beyond birthday bound security. We
provide a full proof of this for a prp construction, and, in the ±prp setting, security
against adversaries who make queries of any single length. As part of our investigation,
we extend an observation by Rogaway and Zhang by further highlighting the close
relationship between online ciphers and tweakable blockciphers with variable-length
tweaks.
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Figure 1: Examples of the construction. On the left is the two layer right shift scheme,
and on the right the three layer reversing instantiated with independent ciphers.
1 Introduction
Modern understanding of symmetric cryptology has come a long way from a straightforward
adaptation (cf. [KL08, Def. 3.30]) of the seminal definitions of probabilistic (public key)
encryption [GM84]. In particular, both authenticated encryption (AE) and variable input
length ciphers have emerged as noteworthy primitives. From an efficiency perspective, a
scheme is ideally one-pass and online, outputting ciphertexts as plaintext becomes available,
yet from a security perspective, ideally a small change in the plaintext effects the entire
ciphertext. This tension between efficiency and security is also evident in the choices made
by submissions to the recent CAESAR competition [Ber13, AFL16]. In this paper, we
concentrate on turning online ciphers into fully fledged ciphers using only two or three
passes (depending on the desired security level), potentially alleviating the need for two
separate modes of operation.
Authenticated encryption provides both confidentiality and integrity (including of
associated data [Rog02]). Modern AE schemes are deterministic and rely on a nonce to
ensure that encrypting the same message twice produces two unrelated ciphertexts: as
long as nonces do not repeat, security is guaranteed. Once nonces do repeat, leaking
plaintext equality patterns is inevitable, but for many schemes the damage is much
worse [Jou06, KR11]. The security goal of misuse resistant AE [RS06] considers whether
and how the security of an AE scheme degrades when a nonce is no longer used just once.
There are many ways to construct authenticated encryption schemes [NRS14, Ber13], but
the number of options reduces drastically when misuse resistance is required. One approach
is the encode-then-encipher (or pad-then-encipher) paradigm [BR00, RS06, ST13], where
(public) redundancy is added to the message before it is being enciphered using a variable
input length strong pseudorandom permutation (±prp cipher).
Variable input length (VIL) ciphers (either ±prp or prp secure) are interesting in their
own right, especially in scenarios where encryption has to occur in situ [BR99]. One
example is adding confidentiality to an existing networking standard, where packet sizes
are fixed and the expansion implicit when using authenticated encryption cannot be
afforded; another application is disk encryption (possibly using tweaks so sectors can still
be accessed independently).
A prp cipher will yield completely different ciphertexts if there is any difference between
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Table 1: Simplified upper bounds on adversarial advantage against our constructions, where
a small advantage implies a secure scheme. Results are parametrised by the maximum
number of queries q of total length σ blocks, the blocksize N and n = logN . Security
bounds for adversaries making variable input length (VIL) or arbitrary input length (AIL)
queries. A bound is “tight” if there exists an attack that asymptotically (in q, σ,N) matches
the security bound.
Construction Goal Security
Linear Layer Ciphers Access Inputs Advantage Proof Tight?
Right-shift 2 prp VIL 1.5 q2/N Theorem 2 Lemma 8
Right-shift 3 prp VIL 1.5(σ/N)2 Theorem 4 Lemma 11
Reversal 2 ±prp VIL Insecure — Lemma 9
Reversal 2 ±prp AIL q2/N Corollary 1 Lemma 8
Reversal 3 ±prp AIL n q/N Theorem 5
plaintexts. This forces at least two passes: one to read the plaintext and one to write the
ciphertext. Once the length of the input increases, a one-pass or online cipher might strike
a better balance between the conflicting goals of efficiency and robust security. An online
cipher [BBKN01] is a variable input length keyed permutation based on a blockcipher
that outputs a ciphertext block as soon as it receives a plaintext block (but still based on
all preceding plaintext blocks). In other words, it allows instant processing of plaintext
and outputting ciphertext on the fly. Since online ciphers cannot be prp secure, relaxed
security notions exist that capture “best possible” security. Online ciphers play a key role
in achieving a similarly relaxed notion of online authenticated encryption with graceful
security degradation against nonce reuse [FFL12].
We believe there are many scenarios where an online cipher’s security limitations are
outweighed by their efficiency, but at the same time there will be situations where full
cipher security is paramount. One could create tailor-made solutions for each of the
primitives, but often it is more desirable to share components. In some circumstances,
this might be solved by using two modes of operation on say AES, but this is not always
possible. For example, hardware security modules (HSMs) do not generally allow direct
access to their internal primitives, so direct access to the underlying blockcipher (or making
single-block calls) may become prohibitively expensive (as each query typically carries a
noticeable latency cost). So, when black-box use of an online cipher is already available
(such as via an existing API), we are tasked to create a true cipher based on the access to
the online cipher only.1
1.1 Our Contribution
We consider schemes formed by composing calls to an online cipher with a simple (publicly
known) mixing layer, and aim to minimize the number of calls made to the online cipher
(Definition 5). We restrict the mixing layer to be blockwise-linear (defined in Section 2.1),
with particular focus on linear layers that simply reorder the blocks, since these can
be implemented most efficiently. Figure 1 highlights two typical constructions under
consideration. Note that neither reversing the blocks nor cycling the final block to the
front is itself is novel: both ideas have been suggested in one way or the other, using
1 Obviously if one had direct access to whatever primitive underlies the online cipher, more efficient
(and known) variable input length ciphers could be constructed. Nonetheless, minimizing the number of
calls as imposed by an API is a metric that has previously shown its worth in the context of authenticated
encryption [BFSW13].
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more traditional IV-based encryption schemes [BR99] or in the context of key-wrap
schemes [Dwo04]. The novelty of our contribution stems from using an online cipher as
underlying primitive, and what we are able to prove as a result. Table 1 provides a summary
of our results. The security bounds are simplifications of those in the paper, compromising
tightness in favour of clarity (for stricter bounds please refer to the relevant theorems). As
a boon, we describe an explicit correspondence between tweakable blockciphers and online
ciphers (Theorem 1), extending an observation by Rogaway and Zhang [RZ11].
If one is not concerned about an adversary making queries of the construction’s inverse,
then only two calls to the online cipher are required to achieve security up to the birthday
bound, in terms of indistinguishability from a random permutation. Indeed, it suffices
for the linear layer to move the final block to the start (Theorem 2), as long as the map
remains invertible. If one requires security beyond the birthday bound (something most
symmetric schemes do not provide), one must make at least three queries to the online
cipher (Lemma 8). Perhaps surprisingly, we find that three suffices: again using simply a
right shift between layers leads to security until almost the blocksize (Theorem 4).
Security against adversaries making inverse queries (i.e. ±prp) is provided by using a
linear layer that reverses the message. Unlike the prp case, using just two online cipher
calls is not sufficient (Lemma 9), but security can be recovered by using a slightly modified
construction (Theorem 3) or restricting the adversary to only making queries of a single
length (Corollary 1). When three rounds are used, security is achieved beyond the birthday
bound (Theorem 5), against adversaries who make queries of just a single length. We are
not aware of any attacks matching this bound, and believe it to also hold in the VIL case
(where adversaries may make queries of variable lengths), leaving these as open problems.
1.2 Applications
We provide a concrete way for converting an online cipher into a true cipher. Our methods
can trivially be extended to form tweakable ciphers from tweakable online ciphers with the
tweaks and bounds of the non-tweak setting, or indeed from a non-tweakable online cipher
to a tweakable cipher. There exist many ways to turn a true cipher into a secure AE scheme
(e.g. encode-then-encipher [BR00, ST13]). Moreover, Hoang et al. demonstrate that with
a tweakable cipher one may achieve the even stronger goal of Robust Authenticated
Encryption [HKR15, Theorem 5] (itself implying full misuse-resistant security [RS06]).
Incorporating our results plugs the gap, allowing one to turn a secure online cipher into
an Authenticated Encryption scheme meeting the strongest of security objectives.
This further reinforces the assertion that online ciphers are an interesting object,
meriting future study. As discussed by Hoang et al., there exist times when a user
has to compromise security in return for other savings [HKR15, Section 1: “Ciphertext
Expansion”] such as reduced power consumption. Our construction provides a method by
which real world devices may do this without requiring multiple primitives. This reduces
the number of possible failure points and may reduce hardware or code footprint, while
decreasing the cost and complexity of certification or verification. When optimal security
is not required, the online cipher may be used directly. However, when security must be
maximised, one may instead use our construction to provide Robust AE security.
1.3 Related Work
The concept of an online cipher was first studied by Bellare et al. [BBKN01], providing
the initial security definitions, against which they investigate some CBC variants. The
security definitions and their relationships were developed through a number of papers
[JMV02, FMP03, FJMV04, BT04].
Later, Rogaway and Zhang exposed the close relationship between tweakable blockci-
phers and online ciphers [RZ11], an observation that has since been exploited by others,
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yielding several explicit constructions (e.g. McOE [FFL12]). There now exist a wide range
of online cipher constructions, such as COPE [ABL+13], POE [AFF+15] and ELmE [DN14],
the majority of which achieve birthday bound security. We are not aware of any online
ciphers whose security might extend beyond the birthday bound; we consider this an
interesting open problem in its own right, for which our research provides additional
motivation.
As part of our study, we investigated some constructions similar to the CMC-core [HR03]
(Section 4.2), finding that upgrading the CBC sections to secure online ciphers was not
sufficient to allow removal of the mixing layer. One of the three round constructions is
similar to the PIV construction of Shrimpton and Terashima [ST13], but as discussed in
Section 5 their results cannot be applied in our setting due to the structure available to
the adversary from the internal online cipher.
The original AESKW algorithm [Dwo04] follows a similar design, since it can be
decomposed into a series of calls to an online cipher and a linear layer, but is provided
without proof; the KW1 algorithm [Dwo04] uses the cyclic shift instead. Our results are a
step towards proving the security of these standardized key wrap mechanisms, but are not
directly applicable since their constructions also carry forward the state of the internal
cipher.
As an alternative to our approach based on an online cipher, one can build a variable
length cipher directly from a blockcipher (as TET [Hal07] or AEZ [HKR15] do), or
extend the domain of a tweakable blockcipher (e.g. Minematsu’s construction [Min09]).
One could use an online cipher to emulate the blockcipher or tweakable blockcipher in
these constructions but this would require excessively many calls to the online cipher,
considerable less efficient than the three calls of our construction. If the online cipher
itself is bootstrapped from a blockcipher to which a designer has direct access, arguably
comparison in terms of blockcipher calls and overhead would be more relevant.
1.4 Context and Caveats
We will model the online cipher as an ideal online permutation, leading to an information-
theoretic proof. Instantiating the scheme with any specific online cipher construction incurs
an extra term (expressing the online-cipher security of the chosen primitive). In order to
retain beyond-birthday security of the overall construction, one will have to instantiate
with an online cipher that itself has beyond-birthday security (e.g. POEx [FLLW16]). We
will assume that the online ciphers are independent for every layer. This approximates
the real constructions, and can itself be easily implemented with a single online cipher
courtesy of the close relationship between tweakable blockciphers with arbitrary length
tweaks and online ciphers (e.g. by prefixing each call with a marker corresponding to the
appropriate cipher), or, alternatively keying or tweaking the ciphers independently suffices.
We express our results in terms of the blocks Σ of a blockcipher, since most online
ciphers are built around some internal block cipher, which is explicitly reflected in their
syntax and security notions. Essentially, this means we consider ciphers with domain
Σ∗, as opposed to the preferable {0, 1}∗. For schemes bootstrapped from AES, we have
Σ = {0, 1}128, which implies that our ciphers operate on input sizes that are a multiple of
128 bits. We ignore this subtle (but practically relevant) shortcoming, that has haunted
other work on online ciphers as well [Nan08, RZ11], and remark that existing domain
completion techniques are not without issue.
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notation
Arrays and lists are indexed from 1, and initialised empty. Within proofs and explanations,
X := Y means that X is defined to be Y . In the context of pseudocode, T ← U means
variable T takes value U . If L is a (finite) set, then L←∪ x is shorthand for L← L ∪ {x},
whereas X ←$ L means that the variable X samples uniformly from L. |L| denotes the
number of elements of L. The symbol ? denotes a wildcard that may take any value from
the appropriate set.
We define bad as the union of bad events badi, so a game sets bad if badi is triggered
for any i. At times badj (similarly badji ) will be used to denote the event of triggering bad
(resp. badi) while interacting with the world or oracle j as appropriate.
To aid verifiability and clarity, longer proofs will be broken up into a number of claims:
each proof of a claim will end with , and will denote the end of the overall proof.
Finally, we will use the terms encryption and decryption (or variants thereof) to describe
forward and backward queries to the construction. We will use the notation ET to refer to
a cipher with tweak T , and E−T will be the inverse of the cipher under this same tweak
(the negation should be viewed as acting on the E rather than on the tweak).
Blocks and strings The results in this paper are intrinsically block oriented, with an
exclusive focus on Σ∗ rather than the more general {0, 1}∗, and we allow this to guide
our definitions. The set of blocks is a finite set Σ, where the blocksize N = |Σ| is often
inherited from some underlying blockcipher—usually N = 2128.
A string of blocks (or simply string) is an element S ∈ Σ∗, where Σ∗ := ⋃∞n=0 Σn. The
length of a string |S| is its length in blocks. For a string X, denote by X[i] the ith block
of X. Let X[i..j] := X[i]|| . . . ||X[j], or the empty string  if j < i, where || denotes the
concatenation of strings. Conversely, X is the blockwise reversal of X, so if m = |X| then
X := X[m]||X[m − 1]|| . . . ||X[1]. We will also let dXek := X[1..k] be the first k blocks
of X (its so-called prefix). The set of non-empty strings is Σ+ :=
⋃∞
n=1 Σn, and thus
Σ+ = {Σ||x : x ∈ Σ∗}.
For any x ∈ {0, . . . , Nm − 1}, denote by 〈x〉m an m-block string that unambiguously
encodes x (the choice of encoding is not important, as long as it is injective). A function
f : Σ∗ → Σ∗ is length preserving if |f(X)| = |X| for any string X. It is blockwise linear if
each output block is a linear combination of the input blocks.
2.2 Primitives
We use a number of standard primitives, in particular the notions of a cipher (e.g. [BR99]),
tweakable blockcipher [LRW02] and online cipher [BBKN01]. The keyspace (which we will
assume to be the same for all our ciphers) is denoted by K, and we assume all ciphers to
be length preserving.
Definition 1 (Cipher). A cipher E is a family of permutations Ek on inputs X ∈ X ⊂ Σ∗
indexed by a key k ∈ K. If X = Σ, we say it is a block cipher. If X = Σ+ and the
construction is length preserving, it is a cipher acting on blocks.
Definition 2 (Tweakable blockcipher). A tweakable blockcipher E˜ is a family of permuta-
tions of Σ, indexed by both a key k ∈ K and a tweak T ∈ T , where T is the tweak space.
We denote application of this permutation to block M ∈ Σ by M ′ ← E˜Tk (M), and its
inverse by M ← D˜Tk (M ′) or M ← E˜−Tk (M ′).
Thus a tweakable blockcipher (TBC) can be thought of as a collection of blockciphers,
an instance of which is chosen by the tweak.
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Definition 3 (Online cipher). An online cipher is a cipher for which the ith block of
ciphertext depends only on the first i blocks of plaintext. Thus it is a family E˚ of
permutations on Σ+ indexed by some k ∈ K, where for any A,B ∈ Σ∗, E˚k(A||B)[1..|A|] =
E˚k(A).
This formalisation of an online cipher (due to Bellare et al. [BBKN01]) describes a
construction that can output ciphertext blocks as soon as the corresponding plaintext
blocks are available. The final type of cipher we define is not widely studied in and of itself,
but often occurs internally as part of the constructions of authenticated encryption modes
based on online ciphers (e.g. [ABL+13]), since it is less susceptible to length extension
attack.
Definition 4 (Online-but-last cipher). An online-but-last cipher is a cipher that is online
for all but the final block. Thus it is a family E of permutations on Σ+ indexed by some
k ∈ K, where for any m > 0 and A ∈ Σm, Ek(A||B)[1..(m− 1)] = Ek(A)[1..(m− 1)] for
all B ∈ Σ∗.
In a purely syntactical sense, an online cipher is also online-but-last. However, a ran-
domly sampled online-but-last cipher E is unlikely to be online, since w.h.p. Ek(A||B)[m] 6=
Ek(A)[m] for any B ∈ Σ+. To pre-empt ourselves somewhat, this means a secure online
cipher is not a secure online-but-last cipher when queries can be made of multiple lengths
(the VIL setting). However, when queries can only be made of a single length (AIL), the
definitions coincide.
Ideal Objects An online permutation on blocks Σ is a length preserving permutation from
p˚i : Σ∗ → Σ∗ such that p˚i(A||B)[1..|A|] = p˚i(A) for all A,B ∈ Σ∗. Define OPerm(Σ) as the
set of all online permutations p˚i with blocks Σ. Then the ideal online permutation samples a
permutation from OPerm(Σ) uniformly, making every possible online permutation equally
likely.
Similarly, we define the ideal primitives for random functions, tweakable block ciphers
and ciphers by first defining the set of all such objects, following standard terminology
neatly collated by Halevi and Rogaway [HR03]. Define Perm(Σ∗) as the set of all length-
preserving permutations pi : Σ∗ → Σ∗; Func(Σ∗) to be the set of all length-preserving
functions $: Σ∗ → Σ∗; Func(T ,Σ) the set of all functions $: T × Σ → Σ where for any
T ∈ T the map M → p˜i(T,M) is length-preserving; and Perm(T ,Σ) the set of functions
p˜i : T × Σ → Σ, where for any T ∈ T the map M → p˜i(T,M) is a length-preserving
permutation. In each case the ideal construction samples an element from the set uniformly
at random.
Slightly more involved is the ideal (tweakable) random function with inverse, in which
the encryption and decryption interfaces are instantiated with independently sampled
(tweakable) random functions, subject to the condition that they never contradict onean-
other. This is commonly done by “lazy sampling”, where values for the function (or
its inverse) are selected as required: with each query, if the value is already defined it
is returned, and if not a value is uniformly sampled and recorded (see Figure 2 for a
code-based definition).
2.2.1 Security Notions
Intuitively, a cipher is secure if even given a large number of input–output pairs, virtually
nothing is known about its behaviour on other values: every permutation that does not
contradict already known information is equally likely. We measure this in terms of the
probability an adversary can distinguish between the real scheme and an idealised version.
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function $T (M)
C←$ Σ|M |
if (T,M, ?) ∈ F then
C ← FT (M)
F ←∪ (T,M,C)
return C
function $−T (C)
M ←$ Σ|C|
if (T, ?, C) ∈ F then
M ← F−T (M)
F ←∪ (T,M,C)
return M
Figure 2: A lazily sampled tweakable random function with inverse, with internal table F .
Adversarial advantages. To capture indistinguishability, we will provide an adversary
access to one of two worlds; the adversary’s task is to determine with which he is commu-
nicating. Each world is a collection of oracles—in this paper interfaces to a function (such
as a permutation) and possibly its “inverse” . Eventually an adversary A interacting with
W will terminate with output x, which we denote by AW → x.
Adversaries are computationally unbounded, but only allowed a limited number of
queries to the available oracles. Without loss of generality, we assume these information
theoretic adversaries are deterministic and minimal (so do not make queries equivalent to
those already made, such as repeating queries).
The distinguishing advantage for adversary A between worlds W0 and W1 is
∆
A
(
W0
W1
)
:=
∣∣P [AW0 → 1]− P [AW1 → 1]∣∣ .
We generalise this to classes of adversaries by taking the maximum advantage of any
adversary in the class. In particular, the maximum advantage for all adversaries making
at most q queries is
∆
q
(
W0
W1
)
:= max
A∈Adversaries
A makes ≤q queries
∆
A
(
W0
W1
)
.
Standard security notions The security notions of prf, prp, tprf, tprp and oprp are defined
by the adversarial advantage in distinguishing a primitive from the ideal random function,
ideal permutation, ideal tweakable permutation and ideal online permutation respectively
(when provided with oracle access to just the encryption interface). Analogously, we define
±prf, ±prp, ±tprf, ±tprp, ±oprp by providing oracle access to both the forward and inverse
interfaces. We delay the security definitions for an online-but-last cipher to Section 3.2.
The complete list is provided in Appendix B, but as an example,
AdvoprpE˚ (A) := P
[
k←$K : AE˚k → 1
]
− P [˚pi←$ OPerm(n) : Ap˚i → 1] .
For some goal xxx, AdvxxxP (q) is defined as the maximum across all adversaries making q
queries. Informally, we say a scheme P is a secure xxx if AdvxxxP (q) is sufficiently small.
AIL and VIL For constructions allowing variable input lengths (such as online ciphers),
the default security notions allow an adversary to make queries of any (adaptively chosen)
lengths. This security notion is referred to as the Variable Input Length (VIL) setting
(e.g. [BR99]). The Arbitrary Input Length (AIL) setting is a restriction of this, allowing
the adversary to make queries of any single length. Effectively, the first query an adversary
makes, fixes this length.
The AIL flavour can be thought of as a point-wise security definition, in that it holds for
any (single) length, but not necessarily multiple lengths at once. The stronger VIL notion
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corresponds to a uniform security definition, holding across all lengths simultaneously. We
differentiate between the two settings by denoting AIL instances by (for example) ±prp•,
letting ±prp denote the VIL case.
2.3 Composition Constructions
We seek a framework for efficiently converting a secure online cipher into a fully secure
cipher, ideally using only a small number of calls to the online cipher, sandwiched together
around some highly efficient invertible mixing layer(s). We ignore pre- or post-whitening
layers, because an adversary can trivially remove them.
Our proofs will be in the standard model, and will all begin by switching out the online
cipher for an ideal online permutation. This step is essentially unavoidable, and requires
the online cipher be secure against adversaries with the access corresponding to that which
they will have to the overall construction. To construct a ±prp, we require the online
cipher be an ±oprp; for a prp it suffices for the online cipher to be an oprp. Henceforth, we
will take this step as read, and instead directly bound the remaining term: the advantage
of distinguishing a construction built around ideal online permutations from a true cipher.
Together, these observations motivate the following definition:
Definition 5 (The ΠLi construction). Define ΠLi to be the composition of i calls to ideal
online permutations E1, . . . , Ei around (i− 1) applications of a public family of blockwise
linear layers L.
So, for example, ΠL2 (M) = E2 ◦ L ◦ E1(M). By considering various combinations of
(L, i), we will observe that some combinations lead to schemes with prp or ±prp• security.
When clear, we may omit the linear layer from the notation.
Just using one call to the online permutation layer implies there is no linear layer, thus
Π1 equals E1, and so is online. Thus it can be trivially distinguished from a prp• with
two queries. Explicitly, the ciphertexts of 〈0〉1||〈0〉1 and 〈0〉1||〈1〉1 will always agree on
the first block of output for an online cipher, yet rarely for a true prp. Similarly, when
L is the identity function, for any i the composition ΠLi is simply that of multiple online
permutation calls, and thus also an online permutation, meaning the same attack applies.
Candidate linear layers The most obvious candidates for linear layers are blockwise
permutations: maps that simply reorder the blocks. In this paper we will focus on the
blockwise reversal map rev as the simplest map that may reasonably lead to a ±prp.
Inspired by the choices of AESKW [Dwo04], we will also consider the right circular shift
right and by association its inverse, the left circular shift left. Formally, for any M ∈ Σm,
these maps are defined by:
right(M) := M [m] || M [1] || . . . || M [m− 2] || M [m− 1]
left(M) := M [2] || M [3] || . . . || M [m] || M [1]
rev(M) := M [m] || M [m− 1] || . . . || M [2] || M [1] .
3 Initial Observations and Standard Results
Before our main investigation, we first cover a number of auxiliary results that later proofs
will build on. After recalling a number of well-known results, we move on to explore the
close relationship between online ciphers and tweakable blockciphers.
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3.1 Standard Proof Techniques
3.1.1 Classical Bounds
To bound various collision events, we’ll use the well-known birthday bound (Lemma 1).
Lemma 2 reproduces the ±prp–±prf switching lemma by Halevi and Rogaway [HR03,
Appendix C], which we use in several proofs to hop from a random permutation to a
random function with inverse.
Lemma 1 (Birthday bound). The probability that a list of q independent random variables
sampled uniformly from Σm contains a repeat is bounded. Explicitly,
q(q − 1)
4 ·Nm ≤ P [a1, . . . , aq←$ Σ
m : ∃i 6= j s.t. ai = aj ] ≤ q(q − 1)2 ·Nm
where the lower bound requires q ≤ √2Nm, and the upper bound holds for all q.
Lemma 2 (±prp–±prf switch). One cannot distinguish a random permutation from a
random function with inverse any better than achieving collisions in the random function,
even when given access to both interfaces. Therefore, if the shortest queries are m blocks
long, ∆
q
(
pi , pi−1
$ , $−1
)
≤ 12q(q − 1)/Nm.
3.1.2 Game-Based Proof Techniques and Lazy Sampling
In this section we discuss a number of game-based proof techinques, based on work by
Bellare and Rogaway [BR06]. We will model standard primitives through “Lazy Sampling”,
where random elements are only sampled when required. Internal variables of a construction
are shared between the corresponding forward and backward interfaces. As an example,
Figure 3 defines an oracle that implements an ideal tweakable permutation through lazy
sampling, with both E˜ and D˜ having access to the same internal table pi that records
previously determined values. Similarly, we will later encounter Figure 5, defining a lazily
sampled ideal online permutation.
Triples as functions To concisely describe the partial state of a lazily sampled function,
we will allow sets of triples to represent partially defined tweakable functions, slightly
overloading the notation. Specifically, the current state of the lazily sampled, tweakable
function pi is identified with the set pi representing its internal table, so piT (M) = C ⇐⇒
(T,M,C) ∈ pi and similarly pi−T (C) = M ⇐⇒ (T,M,C) ∈ pi. Note that neither pi as a
set nor as a function incorporate any lazy sampling on its own: any changes to pi will have
to be explicit (and we’ll use separate notation to denote the function which additionally
takes care of the sampling). In this work, all functions represented in this way will be of the
form pi : Σ∗ × Σ → Σ (the syntax of a tweakable blockcipher introduced in Definition 2),
so we will introduce the following shorthand, allowing ourselves to add a string of blocks
in one go. For any k and M,C ∈ Σk, and any T ∈ Σ∗, we let pi←∪ (T,M,C) concisely
represent “For every i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, pi←∪ (T ||dMei−1,M [i], C[i])”.
Identical-until-bad Several of our proofs will demonstrate two worlds are indistinguishable
until the adversary triggers some event bad, known as identical-until-bad. This allows us to
bound the (in)security of the construction by bounding the probability that an adversary
communicating with either of the two (until this point identical) games can cause a bad
event. We generalise the traditional terminology somewhat, defining what it means for two
worlds to be identical-until-bad, and being less restrictive on our definition of “identical”.
Bellare and Rogaway define identical-until-bad as two code-based games that only
differ in branches that necessarily set bad. We soften this demand by instead requiring
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that the games act identically until a query that sets bad. This means that, until bad is
set, all output variables are identically distributed, as are any variables made available to
other oracles or interfaces, such as bad flags or internal tables pi. This subtle difference
allows us to merge the identical-until-bad and code-reordering steps of the seminal work,
and allows us to consider a whole sequence of games to be identical-until-bad, as long as
every one of them acts identically until bad is set.
Two worlds are identical-until-bad if for any adversary the games induced by the
adversary interacting one of the worlds are identical-until-bad. We might also refer to
two oracles being identical-until-bad, in which case the corresponding worlds that are
identical-until-bad should be clear from the context.
Implications A direct result of using lazy sampling is that it becomes apparent how
similar several of the ideal primitives are to one-another. Our next lemma states this,
providing an alternative description of the afore-mentioned ±prp–±prf switch in terms
of actual code-based games, as well as incorporating tweaks: it is this version we will
use for the actual switching within later proofs. The associated code, given in Figure 4,
defines a tweakable random permutation, a random function, or a pair of random samplers,
depending on which sections of optional code are included. Moreover, since the oracles
given are all identical-until-bad, any combination of the four bad events can be used for
switching. Thus one may switch a random permutation for something that is a random
permutation in the forward direction, and a random sampler in the inverse direction.
If the bad events are bounded directly this technique often leads to excessively large
adversarial advantages (discussed further in Section 3.3). However, when carefully combined
such that bad events align between switches it can be an effective and efficient tool.
Lemma 3 (Code-based ±prp switches). Until either tweak–input or tweak–output pairs
repeat, an ideal tweakable permutation is indistinguishable from a pair of tweakable random
samplers. Moreover, a partial switch can also be performed to exchange the two oracles of
an ideal tweakable permutation for a tweakable random permutation in one direction and a
random sampler in the other. In particular, let p˜i be an ideal tweakable permutation, $ an
ideal tweakable function, and r˜ a tweakable random sampler. Then, for any adversary A,
∆
A
(
p˜i, p˜i−1
$, $−1
)
≤ P [bad2 ∨ bad4] ,
∆
A
(
p˜i, p˜i−1
r˜, r˜−1
)
≤ P [bad1 ∨ bad2 ∨ bad3 ∨ bad4] ,
∆
A
(
p˜i, p˜i−1
p˜i, r˜−1
)
≤ P [bad3 ∨ bad4] ,
and similarly for other combinations.
Proof. This result follows by inspection of Figure 4.
3.2 Equating Online Ciphers and Tweakable Block Ciphers
Online ciphers can be formed from a chain of tweakable blockciphers, an observation
that allowed Rogaway and Zhang to simplify the analysis of online ciphers [RZ11]. We
observe that an even closer relationship exists: an online cipher is a tweakable blockcipher
with variable length tweak. That an online cipher induces a tweakable blockcipher is
simply setting a result of Bellare et al. into modern terminology [BBKN01, Proposition 1],
while the converse is an extension of the result of Rogaway and Zhang. So, the result is
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function E˜T (M)
if (T,M, ?) /∈ pi then
C←$ Σ \ image(piT )
pi←∪ (T,M,C)
return piT (M)
function D˜T (C)
if (T, ?, C) /∈ pi then
M ←$ Σ \ domain(piT )
pi←∪ (T,M,C)
return pi−T (C)
Figure 3: Modelling the tweakable blockcipher E˜ with inverse D˜ via lazy sampling.
function E˜T (M)
C←$ Σ
if (T,M, ?) ∈ pi then
bad1 ← true
C ← piT (M)
else if (T, ?, C) ∈ pi then
bad2 ← true
C←$ Σ \ image(piT )
pi←∪ (T,M,C)
return C
function D˜T (C)
M ←$ Σ
if (T, ?, C) ∈ pi then
bad3 ← true
M ← pi−T (C)
else if (T,M, ?) ∈ pi then
bad4 ← true
M ←$ Σ \ domain(piT )
pi←∪ (T,M,C)
return M
Figure 4: Comparing tweakable random functions. The list pi is initialised empty. To be
a uniform sampler, we include none of the boxed code. A tweakable random function
includes the unboxed code and also the code in dashed boxes. Finally, a tweakable random
permutation uses all of the code. Thus we see the three constructions (and the various
hybrids of them) are all identical-until-bad.
not particularly surprising, but is nonetheless worth highlighting, since it yields neater
terminology to study online ciphers.
We introduce some additional notation to better expose the relationship. Let E˚(·)
be an online cipher and A,B ∈ Σ∗ with |A| = a and |B| = b. Then, define E˚A(B) :=
E˚(A||B)[(a+ 1)..(a+ b)]. So, E˚A(B) returns the output blocks corresponding to B when
processed with a prefix of A. By the online property, E˚(A||B) = E˚(A)||E˚A(B). If we
think of E˚·(·) as a tweakable cipher, A is the tweak under which B is encrypted, and in
the online context, we refer to A as the prefix under which B is encrypted. Thus the prefix
is similar to the state in the incremental online cipher characterisation [RWZ12], except
that prefixes may be arbitrarily large, whereas states have fixed length.
Similarly, we define D˚A(B) := D˚(E˚(A)||B)[(a+1)..(a+b)], which is the inverse of E˚A(B),
as D˚A(E˚A(B)) = B. Computing D˚A(·) is not unreasonably onerous, since to calculate
D˚(A||B) one first calculates M = D˚(A), then D˚(A||B) = M ||D˚M (B), something an online
cipher tends to do internally anyway. Our notation emphasises the correspondence with
tweakable blockciphers, since is A the tweak under which B is decrypted.
Theorem 1. There is a security-preserving, one-to-one correspondence between online
ciphers on blocks Σ and tweakable blockciphers on Σ with tweak space Σ∗.
Proof. We begin by defining a map f from the set of online ciphers to the set of such
tweakable blockciphers. The tweakable blockcipher will call the online cipher on T ||M ,
before discarding all but the final block, effectively using the bulk of the cipher call
preprocessing the tweak. So, if E˚ is an online cipher then f(E˚) is the tweakable blockcipher
f(E˚)Tk (M) := E˚Tk (M) for any M ∈ Σ and T ∈ Σ∗.
Conversely, the map g from tweakable blockciphers to online ciphers will call the
tweakable blockcipher on each block, using previous blocks as the tweak. So, for tweakable
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function EP (M)
C←$ Σ
if (P,M [1], ?) ∈ p˚i then
C ← p˚iP (M [1])
else if (P, ?, C) ∈ p˚i then
C←$ Σ \ image(˚piP )
p˚i←∪ (P,M [1], C)
C ′ ← EP ||M [1](M [2..|M |])
return C||C ′
function DP (C)
M ←$ Σ
if (P, ?, C[1]) ∈ p˚i then
M ← p˚i−P (C[1])
else if (P,M, ?) ∈ p˚i then
M ←$ Σ \ image(˚piP )
p˚i←∪ (P,M,C[1])
C ′ ← DP ||M (C[2..|C|])
return M ||M ′
Figure 5: A mechanism for lazily sampling an ideal online permutation E with inverse D
and internal table p˚i after processing prefix P . The table p˚i is initialised empty. We observe
that if (P,M, ?) /∈ p˚i then (P ||M,?, ?) /∈ p˚i (because of how p˚i is filled in). The routines
above could be simplified by directly sampling from outside the image of p˚i rather than
first sampling uniformly; this mechanism was chosen because to highlight the relationship
with tweakable permutations and facilitate later switches.
blockcipher E˜, the online cipher g(E˜) is defined for all M ∈ Σ∗ with m = |M | by
g(E˜)k(M) := E˜k(M [1])||E˜M [1]k (M [2])|| . . . ||E˜M [1..(m−1)]k (M [m]).
We observe that for any tweakable blockcipher E˜ and online cipher E˚ we have f(g(E˜))k = E˜k
and g(f(E˚))k = E˚k. Thus the maps are in fact inverses, defining a correspondence.
With the correspondence established, we move on to proving it preserves security. The
key observation is that, because the map defines a correspondence between elements, it
must map the set of all tweakable blockciphers onto the set of all online ciphers, and
vice versa. That is, f(OPerm(Σ)) = Perm(Σ∗,Σ) and g(Perm(Σ∗,Σ)) = OPerm(Σ). So,
if an online cipher is distinguishable from the ideal online cipher, by applying f we see
that the corresponding tweakable blockcipher is distinguishable from the ideal tweakable
blockcipher, and vice versa. Thus, security of one implies security of the other.
Online-but-last ciphers An online-but-last cipher is a cipher that is online for all but
the final block. We can expose this feature by extending the tweakable blockcipher
correspondence by adding a second tweakable blockcipher for the final block. So, an
online-but-last cipher Oobl is the concatenation of an online cipher E˚, and a separate
tweakable block cipher E˜ . That is, for a query M ∈ Σm,
Oobl(M) = E˚(M [1..(m− 1)])||E˜M [1..(m−1)](M [m]).
3.3 Ideal Online Permutations
For the remainder of the paper, let E be the encryption routine of a lazily sampled ideal
online permutation, with inverse D, and internal (partial) table p˚i. Figure 5 presents a
code-based definition for how E and D operate and use p˚i internally. When multiple ciphers
Ei are used, the corresponding internal tables will be denoted p˚ii.
Immediate properties of ideal online permutations Applying the correspondence be-
tween tweakable blockciphers and online ciphers, we can view an ideal online permutation
as an ideal tweakable single-block permutation. Consequently, after processing a fresh
prefix, the (remaining) output will appear uniformly random: if no call to E has been
made explicitly or implicitly tweaked by A, then EA(B) is uniformly sampled from all
strings of length |B|. That is, if the adversary has not yet queried EA(·), either directly or
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indirectly as part of a longer query, the output is uniformly random. Moreover, we can
ensure independence between two calls to an ideal online permutation E by taking care
with the length of tweaks: as long as |t| ≥ |u|+ |y|, Et(x) is independent of Eu(y).
Even if tweaks repeat, the final blocks behave sufficiently random to derive meaningful
results. Explicitly, when called with distinct inputs the final output blocks collide with
probability at most that of colliding two blocks sampled uniformly at random.
Lemma 4. Let R = (R1, . . . , Rq) be a list of q blocks, where each Ri = Eti(xi) is the
output of the encryption of a unique input by a random online permutation E, meaning
ti||xi 6= tj ||xj for any i 6= j. Then, the probability of a collision in the list (that Ri = Rj
for i 6= j) is bounded, with P [∃i 6= j s.t. Ri, Rj ∈ R] ≤ 12q(q − 1)/N , where the probability
is taken over the choice of online permutation E.
Proof. Let i 6= j. Then, by construction, Ri = Rj ⇐⇒ Eti(xi) = Etj (xj). If ti = tj ,
then Ri = Rj implies that xi = xj , which contradicts the assumption that all inputs were
unique, and so cannot happen. If ti 6= tj , the tweakable cipher has different tweaks in
instance, and so the two distributions are independent of oneanother. Thus Ri and Rj
are both sampled uniformly at random and independently, and so collide with probability
N−1. So, in either case, P [Ri = Rj | i 6= j] ≤ N−1. Applying the union bound, we get the
required result.
3.3.1 Identical-until-bad switching lemmas
The next two lemmas are essentially extensions of Lemma 3 into the online setting,
though compared to the previous code-based ±tprp–±tprf switches, they are slightly more
cumbersome to define. These lemmas will allow us to replace an ideal online permutation
with an alternative routine that is easier to reason about such that the replacement is
undetectable until a bad event occurs. Lemma 5 demonstrates that we may switch between
the oracles of Figure 7, and use O2 instead of O1, while Lemma 6 shows that the oracles
of Figure 8 may be exchanged, in particular allowing O4 to replace O3, as long as bad
does not occur.
We will require that all queries have a prefix of length p, and total length at least
p+ 1, and will simplify the code by assuming that the prefix–message pair does not repeat,
capturing this unwanted behaviour with a bad event. In each case, we begin by parsing the
input into a triple (P,Q,R) such that |P | = p and |Q| = 1. The choice of variable names
(P,Q,R) is inspired partially by using P for “prefix”, but also to reduce the number of
variables using the same names in later results, making it easier to state which variable in
the lemmas corresponds to which variable in the later theorems.
Direct and indirect adversaries An adversary with direct unrestricted access to any of
the oracles O1, O2, O3 or O4 can easily trigger bad. Taking O1 as an example, querying
(P,Q,R) then (P,Q,R′) will trigger badA. So, when we apply these lemmas, we cannot
simply bound the probability of bad in an abstract setting, and sum it with other partial
bounds. Rather, we must more clearly describe the access the relevant adversary has,
before bounding their ability of triggering bad.
Ultimately, we will be interested in the indistinguishability of constructions built around
calls to ideal online permutations. An adversary will then only have access to the overall
construction which itself triggers internal calls to the ideal online permutation, the inputs
to which are not wholly controlled by the adversary. Lemma 5 and 6 tell us that it is
acceptable to replace these ideal online permutation calls with slightly different objects, so
long as the bad events do not occur. In this significantly more restricted setting, we will
find that the events are sufficiently hard to trigger that they lead to meaningful security
results.
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! ! ? ?
! $ $ $
E
P1 Q1 R1
P2 Q2 R2
$ ! ? ?
$ $ $ $
E
P1 Q1 R1
P2 Q2 R2
1
Figure 6: Intuition behind Lemma 5 (left) and Lemma 6 (right). In either case, P is a
string of p blocks, Q is one block long, with R of variable length. Blocks marked ? have
unknown (and irrelevant) distributions, $ blocks are uniformly sampled, and ! blocks take
a unique value on each query (in some sense). The first diagram represents that the block
Q2, and all subsequent blocks R2, are uniformly sampled until (P1, Q1) repeats or the
combination (P1, Q2) collides. The second extends this, since if P2 is uniformly sampled
then the whole output is uniformly sampled, subject to the same repeat/collision events.
function O1(P1||Q1||R1)
p˚i′ ← p˚i
P2 ← E(P1)
Q2 ← EP1(Q1)
R2 ← EP1||Q1(R1)
if (P1, Q1, ?) ∈ p˚i′ then
badA ← true
if (P1, ?,Q2) ∈ p˚i′ then
badA′ ← true
return P2||Q2||R2
function O2(P1||Q1||R1)
P2 ← E(P1)
Q2←$ Σ
R2←$ Σ|R1|
if (P1, Q1, ?) ∈ p˚i then
badA ← true
if (P1, ?,Q2) ∈ p˚i then
badA′ ← true
p˚i←∪ (P1, Q1||R1, Q2||R2)
return P2||Q2||R2
Figure 7: The oracles O1 and O2 are identical until bad. In each case they have access
to the ideal online permutation E and its internal table p˚i (See Figure 5). The bad events
are equivalent, with the duplicate table p˚i′ only used because the E calls in O1 update p˚i,
rather than it being updated after the bad tests. O1 is simply the result of expanding out
the call to an online cipher via the online property, while O2 expands out some of the
calls before simplifying to something that is identical-until-bad. We use shorthand from
Section 3.1.2 to describe adding each input–output pair to p˚i under the appropriate tweak,
and use blank lines to keep corresponding code aligned.
Unique prefix queries Lemma 5 compares O1, which essentially describes access to E ,
with O2, which replaces the second and third sections of the online permutation call with
simpler routines. So, the lemma essentially allows replacement the later parts of an online
permutation call with random sampling, as long as the prefix and first non-prefix block do
not repeat.
Lemma 5. Fix p ≥ 0, let E be an ideal online permutation with internal table pi, and let
O1 and O2 be the routines given in Figure 7. Consider an adversary A with access to
either O1 or O2. Assume all queries are at least p+ 1 blocks in length, parsed such that
|P1| = p and |Q1| = 1. Then, the oracles O1 and O2 are identical-until-bad.
Proof. O1 is simply the result of separating out a call to the random permutation via the
online property. O2 replaces the second and third of these permutation calls with random
sampling, neglecting to carry over the consistency checks.
The first of these switches (that Q2 may be uniformly sampled) is precisely the case
bad1 ∨ bad2 of Lemma 3. Since (P1, Q1) was fresh (else badA was set), R1 is encrypted
under a new prefix and thus sampled uniformly at random. Finally, these values are added
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function O3(Q1||R1)
p˚i′ ← p˚i
P1←$ Σp
P2 ← E(P1)
Q2 ← EP1(Q1)
R2 ← EP1||Q1(R1)
if (P1, Q1, ?) ∈ p˚i′ then
badA ← true
if (P1, ?,Q2) ∈ p˚i′ then
badA′ ← true
return P2||Q2||R2
function O4(Q1||R1)
P2←$ Σp
P1 ← D(P2)
Q2←$ Σ
R2←$ Σ|R1|
if (P1, Q1, ?) ∈ p˚i then
badA ← true
if (P1, ?,Q2) ∈ p˚i then
badA′ ← true
p˚i←∪ (P1, Q1||R1, Q2||R2)
return P2||Q2||R2
Figure 8: Oracles O3 and O4 are identical-until-bad. E is an ideal online permutation,
with inverse D and internal table p˚i. As with Figure 7, p˚i′ duplicates p˚i to ensure tests are
run against the input list, not an updated one. Inputs are at least 1 block long, parsed such
that |Q1| = 1, and p ≥ 0 is a parameter. Oracle O3 corresponds to calling an ideal online
permutation with a randomised prefix. The output of Oracle O4 is randomly sampled
from Σp+1+|R1|, the set of strings p blocks longer than its input. It does not repeat an
output until bad, and until bad the output of O4 is indistinguishable from the output of a
random permutation on p+ 1 + |R1| blocks.
to the table p˚i to ensure any future calls to the inverse function are consistent. Together,
until bad occurs, O2 is identical to O1, as required.
Random prefix queries Lemma 6 extends Lemma 5 showing that if the prefix is randomly
chosen outside the adversary’s control then the output is essentially uniformly sampled
from all strings of the appropriate rate. The most useful application is one where the
first p blocks of a message are randomly selected outside of the adversary’s control, as
then the output is indistinguishable from that of a random permutation until either of the
bad events occur. Based on the randomness of the oracles themselves, the collision event
badA′ occurs with probability at most q2/|Σ|p+1. Moreover, our constructions will be such
that in general it is hard for an adversary to force a collision on Q1 without ensuring
uniqueness of P1, meaning that the best strategy for triggering badA will also be a random
collision, occurring with roughly the same probability. Thus, by ensuring the conditions
for Lemma 6 are met, it will lead to an overall security bound of around q2/|Σ|p+1 for
some context-dependent value of p.
Lemma 6. Fix p ≥ 0, let E be an ideal online permutation with internal table pi and inverse
D, and let O3 and O4 be the routines described in Figure 8. Consider an adversary A who
may repeat queries, given access to either O3 or O4, making queries of at least 1 block in
length, parsed such that |Q1| = 1. Then, the oracles O3 and O4 are identical-until-bad.
Moreover, until bad, the outputs of O3 or O4 are randomly sampled and non-repeating.
Proof. Oracle O3 is the same as O1 except for an additional line that randomly samples P1.
So, applying Lemma 5, we can swap the corresponding code for the contents of O2. Now,
since P1 is sampled uniformly and E is a permutation with inverse D, we can equivalently
sample P2 and calculate P1. This yields O4, completing the first part of the claim.
For the second, we observe that O4 is a random function, since the output is inde-
pendently uniformly sampled in three sections. Moreover, any output collisions imply
repeated values of (P2, Q2), which implies that (P1, Q2) must have repeated because P1 is
the image of P2 under a permutation. This would have set badA′ , meaning outputs do not
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collide until badA′ occurs. Thus O4, and so also O3, is identical-until-bad to a random
permutation.
3.4 An Identical Until Bad Funnel
Suppose we wish to bound the advantage A has at distinguishing two worlds W0 and W2.
Assume we already have that W0 and W1 are identical-until-bad with bad event badA,
and W1 and W2 are identical-until-bad with bad event badB. Applying the traditional
game-hopping mechanism, one would then apply the triangle inequality to bound
∆
A
(
W0
W2
)
≤ ∆
A
(
W0
W1
)
+ ∆
A
(
W1
W2
)
≤ P [bad1A]+ P [bad1B] .
The identical-until-bad funnel mechanism is based on the observation that until badA∨badB
occurs, W1 is identical to both W0 and W2. Thus, we can more directly bound their
distinguishing distance, with
∆
A
(
W0
W2
)
≤ P [bad1A ∨ bad1B] = P [bad2A ∨ bad2B] ≤ P [bad2] .
In cases where badA and badB are independent this might not gain us anything, but if
badA and badB are statistically dependent this immediately leads to an improved security
bound. Applying induction to this result leads to the following wholly unsurprising (but
certainly useful) result.
Lemma 7 (Identical-until-bad funnels). Let W0, . . . ,Wn be oracles or worlds. Suppose
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and any adversary A the worlds Wi−1 and Wi are identical-until-bad
for some bad event bad1 ∨ · · · ∨ badi. Then,
∆
A
(
W0
Wn
)
≤ P [bad1 ∨ · · · ∨ badn] ≤ P [badn] .
We term the mechanism a funnel because each step further restricts the region over
which the equivalences all hold, “funneling” us into a more restrictive region bounded by
all the bad events. Observe that a requirement for this routine is that each step beyond
the first preserves every bad events used previously, so that all required events continue to
make sense. That said, maintaining the previous requirements is not entirely unhelpful.
Firstly, the funnel allows us to delay bounding the probability of the bad event until
the final oracle, which tends to be simpler to reason about.
It also allows the designer to “reuse” previous bad events “for free”, without collecting
additional terms into our final security bound. To illustrate this, suppose W0 and W1
are identical until badA; W1 and W2 are identical until badA ∨ badB ; W2 and W3 are also
identical until badA ∨ badB ; and W3 and W are identical until badA ∨ badB ∨ badC . Then,
∆
A
(
W0
W
)
≤ P [bad3A ∨ bad3B ∨ bad3C] ≤ P [bad3] ,
which may be substantially smaller than the four terms present in the traditional bound.
4 Two Layer Constructions
In this section we ask the natural question: what can be achieved using two layers? The
most intuitive candidate for a ±prp is Πrev2 , but in Lemma 9 we show that this construction
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M
X
Y
C
E1
L
E2
Key:
= Blocks that are the same across all queries.
! Blocks that are unique across all queries.
$ Blocks that are uniformly sampled.
? Blocks whose distribution is unknown/irrelevant.
Intuition: Since the first block output by L depends linearly on
the final input block, varying only this block ensures that for the
construction the first block of all ciphertexts will be distinct.
1
Figure 9: An attack against the prp• security of ΠL2 (Lemma 8)
is not secure against adversaries who can vary input lengths. By instead using an online-
but-last permutation as our primitive, we are able to achieve full ±prp security (Theorem 3),
even against variable length queries. This implies the prp• security of the original Πrev2
construction (Corollary 1).
First, in Lemma 8 we show that using two calls to the online cipher (and irrespective of
the mixing layer), the best one can achieve is security up to the birthday bound. Effectively
we reverse the logic of the previous attack, moving from guaranteed collisions in the first
block of output to a scenario where the construction never collides on those blocks. When
instantiating the linear layer with a simple one-block right shift, we get prp security up to
this bound (Theorem 2).
Lemma 8. The Π = ΠL2 construction cannot achieve beyond birthday bound security for
message lengths greater than 1, no matter what map is chosen for the blockwise linear
layer L. In particular, Advprp•Π (q) ≥ q(q−1)8·N for all q ≤
√
N .
Proof. Suppose L(X)[1] is independent of X[m] for messages of length m = |X|. Then
the first input block to the second round is independent of the final input block. Thus the
system can trivially be distinguished by querying two messages differing only in the final
block and checking if they share the same first ciphertext block. Henceforth, we assume
that L(X)[1] depends on X[m].
Let M t := 〈0〉m−1||〈t〉1, where m ≥ 2 is chosen arbitrarily to meet length requirements.
The adversary A will vary t to make q ≤ N queries of this form, and A → 1 iff all q
ciphertexts have distinct first blocks. Since A makes q queries, we have that Advprp•Π (q) ≥
P
[
AΠ → 1]− P [Api → 1], terms we now bound directly.
We begin by calculating P
[
AΠ → 1], following the logic shown in Figure 9, and label the
internal variables as M,X, Y,C as per the diagram. By the online property, Xt = E(M t)
begins with m − 1 blocks that are the same across all queries. Since the final block is
encrypted under the same prefix each time, the values of Xt[m] are distinct between
queries. By assumption on L, Y t[1] = L(Xt)[1] depends on Xt[m]. Since the other blocks
of Xt are constant through all queries, we must have that Y t[1] = A ⊕Xt[m] for some
A that is independent of t. An online cipher called on just one block is a permutation,
so equality of C[1] blocks occurs if and only if there is equality in Y [1] variables. Overall
then,
t = u ⇐⇒ M t = Mu ⇐⇒ Xt[m] = Xu[m] ⇐⇒ Y t[1] = Y u[1] ⇐⇒ Ct[1] = Cu[1].
So, if for all pairs t 6= u, the first blocks of the ciphertexts will differ and thus P [AΠ → 1] =
1.
On the other hand, for a random permutation onm > 1 blocks, one expects collisions on
the first output block after enough queries. In particular, the probability all q ciphertexts
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have distinct first blocks is simply the product of the probabilities that the first collision
does not occur on the ith query for all i ≤ q. Thus, in the ideal case,
P [Api → 1] =
q∏
i=1
(
1− (i− 1)(N
m−1 − 1)
Nm − (i− 1)
)
≤
q−1∏
i=0
(
1− i2N
)
≤ 1− q(q − 1)8 ·N .
It is for the final inequality that we require the bound on q.
Taking the difference between these terms, we haveAdvprp•Π (q) ≥ q(q−1)8·N , as claimed.
4.1 Right Shifting Towards a prp
Two obvious candidates for the linear layer are the right and left rotations by one block.
For messages of at least i+ 1 blocks, Πlefti is not a prp•, since the first output block cannot
possibly depend on the final input block. Moreover, this means Πrighti cannot be an ±prp•,
since its inverse is the Πlefti scheme instantiated around D unless the message length is
smaller than the number of rounds.
Combining this limitation with Lemma 8 (two layer constructions cannot be indistin-
guishable from a prp• with beyond birthday bound security), Πright2 is at best a prp up to
the birthday bound. This is in fact the case, a statement formalised as follows:
Theorem 2. Let L be an invertible linear layer that satisfies L(M [1]|| · · · ||M [m])[1] =
M [m], such as right. Then, the ΠL2 construction is indistinguishable from a random
permutation up to the birthday bound. Explicitly, AdvprpΠL2 (q) ≤
q(q−1)
N .
Proof. We will use a very simple identical-until-bad style argument, moving from the real
world to the ideal world. Assume that the final block of output from the first online
permutation call is always unique (at the cost of a birthday bound collision term, by
Lemma 4). Then, by assumption on the linear layer, the first input block to the second
online permutation call is unique. Thus we can apply Lemma 6 in the case p = 0 to switch
out the second online permutation call for routine whose output is uniformly sampled
and non-repeating (moving from the O3 case to the O4 case). After this switch, the
construction is identical-until-bad to an ideal permutation.
Therefore, it remains to measure the two bad events from the application of Lemma 6.
The first bad event from the lemma is that the first block of input repeats, which by
assumption never occurs. The second bad event is that the first block of output repeats,
which is again a birthday bound collision event.
Thus the construction is identical-until-bad to a random permutation until either of
these two birthday bound collision events occur, and their sum gives the claimed result.
4.2 Two Layers Versus ±prp Security
We move on to consider ±prp security. Such a scheme will still be susceptible to the
birthday attack given in Lemma 8, but what are the minimum properties required of the
linear layer to meet this bound? To prevent a similar attack to the single layer construction,
where certain message blocks could be changed without affecting large portions of the
ciphertext, the linear layer must move blocks to and from each end of its input. This
means that for any strings X,Y ∈ Σm, L(X)[1] must depend on X[m], and L−1(Y )[1]
must depend on Y [m].
So, the most intuitive candidate is Πrev2 : the two layer construction instantiated around
a linear layer that reverses the order of the blocks. However this turns out to be insecure
in the VIL setting, as shown by the following attack.
Lemma 9. The ±prp advantage against Πrev2 is Adv±prpΠrev2 (q) ≥ 1−N
−1 for all q ≥ 4.
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Figure 10: Attack against Πrev2 , as described in Lemma 9. The adversary A makes the four
queries shown in this diagram, and returns 1 if the two values labelled C ′2 agree. Shown in
the diagram are the internal variables corresponding to this in the real case, demonstrating
that the collision will always occur, an event that almost never occurs in the ideal case.
Proof. We will provide an explicit adversary A, making 4 queries, each of at most 3
blocks. Note that the attack can be easily generalised to comply with most reasonable
message-length requirements by replacing the blocks P1, P2 and P3 with strings of blocks
of an appropriate length.
Let Π and Π−1 be oracles corresponding to the construction, and let E be the internal
online permutation. We will use “Enc” to refer to the adversaries forward oracle, and “Dec”
for their inverse oracle.
Adversary A makes four queries of varying lengths to the construction, as visualised
in Figure 10. First, A picks an arbitrary three-block string P1||P2||P3, and queries
C1||C2||C3 ← Enc(P1||P2||P3). Next, A queries P ′2||P ′3 ← Dec(C3||C2) and then C ′2||C ′1 ←
Enc(P1||P2). Finally, A queries α← Enc(P ′2) and returns 1 if and only if α = C ′2.
As shown in the figure, we will always have AΠrev2 → 1. Let X1||X2||X3 := E(P1||P2||P3).
Then, by the online property, C3||C2 = E(X3||X2). So, P ′2||P ′3 = E−1(rev(E−1(C3||C2)) =
E−1(X2||X3), and thus P ′2 = E−1(X2). Similarly, C ′2||C ′1 = E(rev(E(P1||P2))) = E(X2||X1),
and so C ′2 = E(X2). Therefore Π(P ′2) = E(rev(E(P ′2))) = E(X2) = C ′2.
In the ideal case, when interacting with an ideal permutation pi rather than the
construction Π, the coincidence will almost certainly not occur, with P
[
Api,pi−1 → 1
]
=
N−1. Taking the difference between these two terms, we see that A almost always
distinguishes the scheme from an ideal permutation.
A natural follow-up question is what minor modifications are required to make the
scheme secure. To answer this, we show that the scheme is secure if built around an
“online-but-last” permutation. This is a permutation acting on blocks where the final block
acts like an independent tweakable permutation for each query length, but is online for all
previous blocks.
Since an online permutation is identical to an online-but-last permutation when only
queried with messages a fixed length, this proves the AIL security of Πrev2 .
Theorem 3. The two round construction Π, built from an online-but-last permutation
around the linear layer that reverses the order of the blocks, is a secure VIL–±prp up to
the birthday bound. Explicitly, Adv±prpΠ (q) ≤ q(q − 1)/N .
Corollary 1. Πrev2 is a secure ±prp• until the birthday bound, Adv±prp•Πrev2 (q) ≤ q(q− 1)/N .
Proof of Theorem 3. We will use an identical-until-bad proof mechanism, following the
intuition shown in Figure 11 and using the variable naming given there. So, upon query M ,
we set B||X1||A←M , where |X1| = |M | − 2 and |A| = |B| = 1. Note that this excludes
single-block queries, but an adversary can learn nothing from these since single-block
queries to an online-but-last cipher are independent from queries of any other length.
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A2B2
B3 X3 A3
Key:
? Blocks whose distribution is unknown/irrelevant.
! Blocks that are unique across all queries.
$ Blocks that are uniformly sampled.
$→ ! Block takes different values with high probability.
Intuition: Inputs must be distinct, so with high probability the fi-
nal block from the first layer is unique. If so, the first input block
to the second layer is unique, and so the remaining output is sam-
pled uniformly. By symmetry, a similar argument can be applied for
inverse queries, checking for collisions in the equivalent place.
1
Figure 11: Intuition behind the AIL-±prp security of Πrev2 , as shown by the VIL security
of an Online-but-last scheme (Theorem 3).
Consider first the encryption routine. As discussed in Section 3.2, an online-but-last
cipher is an online cipher whose final block call has been replaced with an independent
TBC, and we swap out this independent TBC for a TPRF. Since the adversary never
repeats a query, the inputs to the TBC never repeat, and so its output (B2) is uniformly
sampled, independent of the input. This means that the second call to the online-but-last
cipher always begins with a uniformly sampled block, and so (by the online-but-last version
of Lemma 6 with p = 0), its output (B3||X3) is indistinguishable from the output of a
random permutation until there is a collision on B2.
The equivalent switches in decryption are undetectable until the adversary either can
distinguish the tprp–tprf switch or collide on the randomly sampled A2. Making both sets
of switches at the same time we reach a scheme that is indistinguishable from a ±prp, so it
remains to bound the probability of detecting these switch events. The tprp–tprf switches
are (collectively) bounded by Lemma 2, since the bound is maximised by an adversary who
makes only queries of a single length. The probability of colliding the random variables
with those from any previous query (encryption or decryption) is bounded by Lemma 1.
Summing these two terms, the overall advantage is bounded by q(q − 1)/N .
5 Three Round Constructions: Moving Beyond the Birth-
day Bound
We have shown that birthday bound security is the best possible with just two layers. A
natural question is whether security increases with more calls to the online cipher. We
find in the affirmative: there exist schemes making three calls to the online cipher that
achieve markedly better security. In particular, Πright3 achieves prp security beyond the
birthday bound, and Πrev3 achieves ±prp• security up until almost the blocksize.
Similarity to PIV The Πrev3 construction can be rephrased in a way that is similar to the
PIV wide-block tweakable blockcipher design of Shrimpton and Terashima [ST13], and the
proofs follow a similar overall design. In each case, the first round encrypts a few blocks
of input tweaked by the whole message: either through an explicit tweakable blockcipher
(as in PIV) or implicitly via the final blocks of the online cipher (as with Πrev3 ). These
encrypted blocks are then used as a unique tweak to encrypt the remaining message blocks,
before the encrypted blocks are then re-encrypted to ensure the system cannot be broken
with inverse queries. Their result is not directly applicable because the final blocks of an
online cipher are not a secure ±prp: they may leak plaintext repetition patterns. As such,
if messages are too short, a PIV-style construction would also leak these patterns.
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Key:
? Blocks whose distribution is unknown/irrelevant.
! Blocks that do not repeat too frequently.
$ Blocks that are uniformly sampled.
$→ ! Block that does not repeat frequently.
Intuition: To achieve beyond birthday bound security, we can no
longer fail if single block collisions occur. Instead, we observe that,
since B2 does not repeat “too frequently”, we can perform a PRP–
PRF switch on the call defining A3. Thus the block A3 is sampled
uniformly, and independently of B2. Then, since the first two blocks
input to the final call almost never repeat (as a pair), the remaining
blocks are uniform.
1
Figure 12: Intuition behind the prp security of Πright3 (Theorem 4)
5.1 Three Layer Shift: A prp to Almost Blocksize
As with the two layer version, Π = Πright3 cannot hope to achieve good ±prp security
because its inverse is trivially distinguishable. Moreover, there exists an attack against the
prp• security of all the Πrighti schemes (described later as Lemma 11), and substituting in
the appropriate parameters shows that if N ≥ 4 and messages are at least 4 blocks long,
Advprp•Π (q) ≥ q(q−1)8N2 ≈ ( qN )2 for q ≤ N . Thus the best we can reasonably expect is prp
security up to the blocksize, something we now demonstrate is attainable. This constitutes
a significant improvement over Theorem 2’s birthday bound. Again, we present the logic
behind our proof in a diagram (Figure 12).
The key observation behind the proof is that B2 does not repeat “too frequently”,
allowing us to perform a (tweakable) random permutation–random function switch on the
final block of the second layer and simplify the construction. Then we apply Lemma 6 to
demonstrate the scheme similar to a random permutation, and measure the appropriate
events.
Theorem 4. The Π = Πright3 construction is a variable input length prp, where for all
adversaries making queries totalling at most σ blocks, AdvprpΠ (σ) ≤ 1.5σ(σ−1)N2 .
Proof. We split the internal variables into three sections (Ai, Xi and Bi) such that for
an m block message M , |Ai| = |Bi| = 1 and |Xi| = m− 2, for all i ∈ {1, . . . , 4}. We set
X1||A1||B1 ← M , and “track” the ordering of these sections through the linear layers.
Each time the permutation is called, the appropriate blocks of its output will be labelled
by the same letter (and incremented index), meaning the ciphertext C = A4||B4||X4. We
label the three ideal online permutations E1, E2, E3, and they will be lazily sampled, with
internal tables p˚i1, p˚i2, p˚i3. This labelling, and the logic described below, are represented in
Figure 12, which sketches how we convert from the Πright3 scheme to a random function, a
standard switch away from a random permutation.
Formally, we consider a series of claims and use an identical-until-bad style argument,
stepping between collections of oracles, before applying the funnelling techinque to bound
the adversarial advantage. First we justify that single block queries do not assist the
adversary (Claim 1). Next, we define a routine (Figure 13) and demonstrate it identical-
until-bad to one of the random permutations in the construction (Claim 2). Then, we show
that substituting this into Πright3 and applying Lemma 6 leads to a construction perfectly
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function E˜2(B2||X2||A2)
B3 ← E2(B2)
X3 ← EB22 (X2)
A3←$ Σ
if (B2, A2) ∈ LA then
badA ← true
if (B2, A3) ∈ LB then
badB ← true
LA←∪ (B2, A2)
LB ←∪ (B2, A3)
p˚i2←∪ (B2||X2, A2, A3)
return B3||X3||A3
Figure 13: The function E˜2 is identical-until-bad to E2. As well as updating the lists
LA,LB to track bad events, E˜2 must record the sampled output A3 in p˚i2 in case a later
(longer) query is made for which this is a prefix.
secure until bad is set (Claim 3). Finally, we measure the probability of bad (Claim 4) to
complete the proof.
We will assume before querying any long messages, the adversary first queries on
all prefix strings. This assumption allows us to make statements about the freshness
of inputs/outputs of the final block of a query, but it leads to a loss of tightness when
considering adversaries who do not make queries of many (if any) different lengths. We
assumed the adversary first queried all prefixes of their chosen query, so to switch back
our overall bound must be given in term of the total number of blocks σ, rather than the
number of queries q.
Claim 1. Single block queries do not assist the adversary. For any adversary A there
exists an adversary B making no queries of length 1 such that AdvprpΠ (A) = Adv
prp
Π (B).
Proof. First, B samples a random single-block permutation P . Then, B runs A, answering
single-block queries with P and forwarding all of As longer queries to his own oracle. When
A terminates, B forwards the response as his own.
In the ideal case, B perfectly simulates the ideal world for A, and so P [Api → 1] =
P [Bpi → 1]. In the real case, we observe that the restriction of an ideal online permutation
to a single block is an ideal permutation. Since all the later claims are independent of the
distribution of the first block of E1, we may switch this for a random permutation without
loss. Thus B also perfectly simulates the real world to A, and P
[
AΠ → 1] = P [BΠ → 1].
Taking the difference completes the claim. 
Henceforth, we assume that the adversary never makes single block queries, and thus
label the internal variables as in Figure 12, with the possibility that |Xi| = 0.
Claim 2. E˜2 (Figure 13) is identical to E2 until bad.
Proof. E˜2 expands the online permutation call slightly, separating the final block and then
applying a random permutation to random function switch. Thus it replaces the line
A3 ← EB2||X22 (A2) with A3←$ Σ and updates the table p˚i2 accordingly. Until (B2, A2)
repeats (setting badA), either the input or tweak is fresh, and thus the output is not
pre-determined.2 The check for badB confirms that the output has not been chosen to
2 Indeed, this is true until (B2||X2, A2) repeats, but we chose to record the smaller (more probable)
event as it lines up more neatly with other bad events we will consider.
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function Π(M)
X1||A1||B1 ←M
X2||A2||B2 ← E1(X1||A1||B1)
B3||X3||A3 ← E2(B2||X2||A2)
A4||B4||X4 ← E3(A3||B3||X3)
CheckForBad(*)
return A4||B2||X4
procedure CheckForBad(*)
if (B2, A2) ∈ LA then
badA ← true
if (B2, A3) ∈ LB then
badB ← true
if (A3, B3) ∈ LC then
badC ← true
if (A4, B4) ∈ Lout then
badout ← true
LA←∪ (B2, A2)
LB ←∪ (B2, A3)
LC ←∪ (A3, B3)
Lout←∪ (A4, B4)
function Π′(M)
X1||A1||B1 ←M
X2||A2||B2 ← E1(X1||A1||B1)
B3 ← E2(B2)
X3 ← EB22 (X2)
A3←$ Σ
A4||B4||X4 ← E3(A3||B3||X3)
p˚i2←∪ (B2||X2, A2, A3)
CheckForBad(*)
return A4||B2||X4
function Π′′(M)
X1||A1||B1 ←M
X2||A2||B2 ← E1(X1||A1||B1)
B3 ← E2(B2)
X3 ← EB22 (X2)
A4←$ Σ
A3 ← D3(A4)
B4←$ Σ
X4←$ Σm−2
p˚i2←∪ (B2||X2, A2, A3)
CheckForBad(*)
return A4||B4||X4
Figure 14: Π is the code for the original scheme, with the online permutation calls
separated and the blocks reordered according to right. Moving from Π to Π′ corresponds
to expanding out the second permutation call and substituting E˜2 in for E2. The switch
from Π′ to Π′′ is application of Lemma 6 to the line A3←$ Σ and the call to E3. Overall,
Π is identical to both Π′ and Π′′ until procedure CheckForBad triggers bad.
contradict the permutation property. Thus until bad is set, this is identical to the random
online permutation E2. 
Claim 3. Consider the oracles given in Figure 14. Until bad is set, Π behaves identically
to both the random function defined by Π′′ and a random permutation.
Proof. To move from Π to Π′ one substitutes E˜2 in for E2, since all the bad events are
already provided by the CheckForBad procedure. Thus by Claim 2, until bad is set
these two routines are identical. Now, consider the later part of Π′: the lines A3←$ Σ
and its successor, which applies E3. These are the form required to apply Lemma 6
with p = 1, where the bad events of that lemma are equivalent to badC and badout
of the CheckForBad procedure. So, Π′ is identical-until-bad to Π′′, and thus Π is
identical-until-bad to Π′′.
Similar to the second part of Lemma 6, Π′′ is a random function and thus a random
permutation until the output repeats, which would be captured by the badout event, since
a repeated output of A4||B4||X4 necessarily implies repetition of (A4, B4). 
Claim 4. The probability an adversary interacting with Π′′ sets bad is P [bad] ≤ 1.5q(q −
1)/N2.
Proof. The event badA is that of colliding on the last two blocks output by an online
permutation. By the same argument as Lemma 4, the probability of this event is bounded
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E3
Key:
? Strings of blocks whose distribution is unknown/irrelevant.
! Strings of k blocks that do not repeat too frequently.
$ Strings of blocks that are uniformly sampled.
$→! Strings of blocks that are uniformly sampled and so don’t re-
peat too frequently.
Intuition: The key observation behind the proof is that, until cer-
tain pairs of blocks repeat, the online ciphers act like tweakable
random functions, which themselves act like independent uniform
samplers. To formalise this, perform a sequence of switches on the
scheme, demonstrating it is an ±PRP until certain bad events occur.
The diagram to the left provides a representation of this, and il-
lustrates the naming system used in the proof. EachAi, Bi is a single
block,Xi a string of blocks of length |Xi| = |M | − 2. The most im-
portant collision event is on (A2, B2). Finally, we prove it is hard for
an adversary to trigger one of these events.
1
Figure 15: Intuition behind the ±prp security of Πrev3 (Theorem 5)
by 12q(q − 1)/N2. The probability of colliding on B2 on any particular query is at most
N−1, and also for A3 since they are independent. Thus the probability of badB is at
most 12q(q − 1)/N2. Since B3 is the image of B2 under a permutation, collisions on B3
imply collisions of B2. So, badC cannot occur without badB first occurring. Finally, badout
occurs if the pair (A4, B4) repeats, which is simply a collision of independently sampled
values, again at the cost of 12q(q − 1)/N2. Collecting these values,
P [bad] ≤ P [badA] + P [badB ] + P [badout] ≤ 3 · q(q − 1)2N2 . 
All together then, the difference between Π and a random permutation is at most that
of setting bad, which is bounded as stated.
5.2 Three Layer Reverse: ±prp• Beyond the Birthday Bound
So, by Theorem 4, there exist three layer constructions with security beyond the birthday
bound, and in this section we investigate whether the Πrev3 construction is a ±prp beyond
the birthday bound. Similar to the previous result, we will prove the construction secure
until a birthday-style collision on pairs of blocks, and so achieve security up to almost the
blocksize, provided an adversary restricts its queries to a single length (the AIL case).
Surprisingly, the VIL case appears significantly more nuanced. Roughly speaking, an
adaptive adversary can perform an attack similar to that against the two-round construction
(Lemma 9), which forces any modelling or simulation attempts within our proofs to define
internal variables early, then make later queries in which the proof depends on freshness of
these values. Unlike the two-round case however, we have not been able to extend this into
an attack against the actual scheme, leaving the question of VIL security open at present.
We hope our AIL proof can eventually be extended to the VIL case: the majority of
the internal claims are true in both settings For the exposition, we favour clarity over
tightness, so our bound can trivially be improved by a small factor.
Theorem 5. Set Π3 = Πrev3 to be the construction built from three independent online
permutations, around two calls of rev. Then the adversarial advantage in distinguishing Π3
from an AIL random permutation is bounded. For any adversary making q ≤ N/8 queries,
Adv±prp•Π3 (q) ≤
q
N
log2N.
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function Π(M)
X1||A1||B1 ←M
X2||A2||B2 ← E1(X1||A1||B1)
B3||A3||X3 ← E2(B2||A2||X2)
X4||A4||B4 ← E3(X3||A3||B3)
return X4||A4||B4
function Π−1(M)
X4||A4||B4 ← C
X3||A3||B3 ← D3(X4||A4||B4)
B2||A2||X2 ← D2(B3||A3||X3)
X1||A1||B1 ← D1(X2||A2||B2)
return X1||A1||B1
function Enc(M)
X1||A1||B1 ←M
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
X2||A2 ← E1(X1||A1)
B2 ← EX1||A11 (B1)
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
B3 ← E2(B2)
A3←$ Σ
X3←$ Σ|M |−2
if (B2, A2, ?) ∈ p˚i2 then
badB ← true
if (B2, ?, A3) ∈ p˚i2 then
badB′ ← true
p˚i2←∪ (B2, A2||X2, A3||X3)
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
X4||A4 ← E3(X3||A3)
B4←$ Σ
if (X3||A3, B3, ?) ∈ p˚i3 then
badC ← true
if (X3||A3, ?, B4) ∈ p˚i3 then
badC′ ← true
p˚i3←∪ (X3||A3, B3, B4)
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
return X4||A4||B4
function Dec(M)
X4||A4||B4 ←M
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
X3||A3 ← D3(X4||A4)
B3 ← DX3||A33 (B4)
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
B2 ← D2(B3)
A2←$ Σ
X2←$ Σ|M |−2
if (B2, A2, ?) ∈ p˚i2 then
badB ← true
if (B2, ?, A3) ∈ p˚i2 then
badB′ ← true
p˚i2←∪ (B2, A2||X2, A3||X3)
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
X1||A1 ← D1(X2||A2)
B1←$ Σ
if (X1||A1, ?, B2) ∈ p˚i1 then
badA ← true
if (X1||A1, B1, ?) ∈ p˚i1 then
badA′ ← true
p˚i1←∪ (X1||A1, B1, B2)
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
return X1||A1||B1
Figure 16: The scheme Πrev3 as oracles (E,D), followed by a construction (Enc,Dec) that
is identical-until-bad. To generate (Enc,Dec) out of (E,D) one applies Lemma 5 to swap
out E2, D2, E3 and D1. The dashed lines are for guidance only, and separate the elements
of the routine coming from each of the three ideal online permutations. The parsing of M
is done such that for a message of length m, |X| = m− 2 ≥ 0 and |A| = |B| = 1. Since
(Enc,Dec) are identical to random permutation until bad, bounding bad also bounds the
distinguishing advantage against Πrev3 .
Proof. Applying Lemma 5 to Π3, we will derive a construction (Figure 16) that is identical-
until-bad to both Πrev3 and a random permutation (Claim 1). Then, we bound the
probability of bad, (Claims 2 to 5) to complete the result.
The variable naming scheme and parsing will follow those given in Figure 15. E1 is
an ideal random permutations with inverse D1 and will be lazily sampled with internal
table p˚i1, and similarly for E2 and E3. The case where |M | = 1 is trivially secure, since the
restriction of an ideal online permutation to a single block is a random permutation, so
assume all queries are of at least two blocks. Then, parsing of M is done such that for a
message of length m ≥ 2, |X| = m− 2 and |A| = |B| = 1.
Claim 1. The pair (Enc,Dec) given in Figure 16 are identical-until-bad to the appropriate
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routines of Πrev3 . Moreover, they are identical-until-bad to a random permutation.
Proof. We will prove that the pair (Enc,Dec) in Figure 16 is identical to Πrev3 , shown as
(Π,Π−1) in the same figure, until an adversary can trigger one of the bad events given
in (Enc,Dec). Converting from (E,D) to the (Enc,Dec) is achieved through repeated
application of Lemma 5. To swap out E2 we use the case p = 1, and thus (P1, Q1, R1) =
(B3, A3, X3), We also switch out E3, using the case p = |M | − 1, which corresponds
to setting (P1, Q1, R1) = (X3||A3, B3, ), then removing the superfluous code. We also
apply the corresponding switches to D2 and D1. Since each of these (four) switches was
identical-until-bad, applying all of them is as well.
Following the same logic used in Lemma 6, (Enc,Dec) are a random function with
inverse, since their outputs are sampled uniformly and independent of input. In the
Enc case, B4 is sampled directly, while (X4||A4) is the image of (X3||A3), which is itself
uniformly sampled. Similarly, in Dec B1 is sampled directly, with X1||A1 the the image
of a uniformly sampled variable under permutation. Moreover, output collisions do not
occur without triggering bad, specifically badC′ for Enc and badA′ for Dec. Thus it is also
a random permutation until bad. 
Claim 2. Assuming ¬badB∧¬badB′ , the probability of setting badA∨badA′∨badC∨badC′
is small, with P [badA ∨ badA′ ∨ badC ∨ badC′ |¬badB ∧ ¬badB′ ] ≤ 12q(q − 1)/N2.
Proof. We observe a symmetry between the two pairs of bad events: only encryption can
trigger badC or badC′ , and only decryption can trigger badA or badA′ . Let us assume
the ith query is made to Enc, and that no bad events have yet triggered, to bound the
probability of setting badC ∨ badC′ . We consider two cases, depending on |M |.
Firstly, consider the case |M | > 2, and thus |X| ≥ 1. Then, the probability of setting
badC ∨ badC′ is upper bounded by that of colliding on the prefix (X3||A3), since without
a prefix collision neither event can occur. Thus badC ∨ badC′ requires that X3||A3 takes a
value that it has taken previously, the probability of which is upper bounded by (i− 1)/N2
since X3 and A3 are uniformly sampled.
Alternatively, suppose |M | = 2 and thus |X| = 0. Then, the probability of setting
badC′ is (i− 1)/N2, since it requires the pair of uniformly sampled blocks (A3, B4) to take
a value already present in a list of length i − 1. The event badC can only occur if on a
previous query A3||B3 occurred as internal variables. Since B3 is the image of B2 under a
permutation, this implies that the pair (B2, A3) also repeated, meaning badB′ had already
been set. Given the assumption on badB′ , this cannot occur, and thus such queries cannot
trigger badC .
So, in either case, the probability of an encryption query setting badC ∨ badC′ is at
most (i− 1)/N2.
Applying the same logic to decryption queries, we also bound the probability the ith
query is a decryption query and triggers badA ∨ badA′ by (i− 1)/N2. Since every query is
either encryption or decryption, but not both, the probability of any single query triggering
any one of the four events must also be this value, and applying the union bound completes
the claim. 
Claim 3. For any α ∈ N, the probability of setting badB ∨ badB′ on the ith query if it has
not previously been set is bounded, with
P [badB ∨ badB′ first set on query i] ≤ α
N
+ α
N − i+ 1 +
1
(α+ 1)!
(
i− 1
N
)α+1
.
Proof. For all j, let Aj1 be the value A1 took on the jth query, and similarly for all other
variables. Let Qi :=
{
(Aj2, A
j
3) | j < i ∧Bj2 = Bi2
}
. Finally, let α ∈ N be a parameter,
which will bound how large we expect the largest of the Qis to be.
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With this notation in hand, we can rewrite the event probability that an adversary
interacting with (Enc,Dec) can trigger badB or badB′ on their ith query, and upper bound
it by
P [badB ∨ badB′ first set on query i]
= P
[
(Ai2, ?) ∈ Qi ∨ (?,Ai3) ∈ Qi
]
≤ P [(Ai2, ?) ∈ Qi]+ P [(?,Ai3) ∈ Qi]
≤ P [(Ai2, ?) ∈ Qi|#Qi ≤ α]+ P [(?,Ai3) ∈ Qi|#Qi ≤ α]+ P [#Qi > α] .
We now bound these terms for an encryption query, as decryption is equivalent.
Immediately, as Ai3 is sampled uniformly at random on every query we can bound the
first term, with P
[
(?,Ai3) ∈ Qi|#Qi ≤ α
] ≤ α/N .
Given the adversary does not repeat queries, for any j such that (Aj2, ?) ∈ Qi then
Xi1||Ai1 6= Xj1 ||Aj1, because otherwise the online property would ensure B2 6= Bj2 (and thus
Aj2 6= Qi). Now, if X1 = Xj1 this means that A1 6= Aj1, and so by the online property
A2 6= Aj2. So, the only way (Ai2, ?) ∈ Qi is if there exists a previous query j with Bi2 = Bj2
such that Xi1 6= Xj1 and EX
i
1(Ai1) = EX
j
1 (Aj1).
The adversary cannot detect a collision Ai2 = A
j
2 if there was not also a collision on
either X2 or B2. By assumption this is the first time badB has occurred, and we know that
Xi1 6= Xj1 , so the adversary has no information that can further assist them in triggering
this collision.3 So, this is simply the probability that an element of a partial random
permutation with at most i − 1 terms defined is already specified in a separate list of
length at most α, which is upper bounded by α/(N − i).
Finally, we bound P [#Qi > α]. It is maximised if each query is made with a different
prefix Xi1||Ai1, since for any two queries sharing a prefix the online property forces the
final output blocks to differ. So, P [#Qi > α] ≤
(
i−1
N
)α+1
/(α+ 1)! by a standard collision-
counting argument.
Collecting these three terms together gives the claimed bound. 
Claim 4. Assume q ≤ N/8 and let n = log2N . Then the probability of setting badB∨badB′
within q queries is bounded, with P [badB ∨ badB′ ] ≤ qN
( 5n
7 +
1
2
)
.
Proof. By assumption, q/N ≤ 1/8. So, by Claim 3, we can upper bound the probability
of setting badB ∨ badB′ by
P [badB ∨ badB′ first set on query i] ≤ α
N
+ α
N − q +
1
(α+ 1)!
( q
N
)α+1
≤ α
N
+ α
N
· 87 +
1
(α+ 1)! · 8α+1 .
So, applying the union bound and collecting like terms,
P [badB ∨ badB′ ] ≤ 15α7 ·
q
N
+ 18α+1(α+ 1)!q.
Wemay assume n = log2N ≥ 3, since otherwise q ≤ N/8 would imply q = 0 and P [bad] = 0.
So, fixing α = bn/3c, we have that 8α+1 ≥ 8n/3 ≥ N and (α+1)! ≥ α+1 ≥ 2. Substituting
these in yields P [badB ∨ badB′ ] ≤ qN
( 5n
7 +
1
2
)
, which is the bound claimed. 
3 This step would fail in the VIL case. If the adversary may make variable length queries, it is
conceivable that they may make a length-extension style attack: first finding a pair X1||A1 and X′1||A′1
that lead to a collision EX1 (A1) = EX′1 (A′1). With this in hand, varying values B1, B′1 until the collision
extends to EX1 (A1||B1) = EX′1 (A′1||B′1) despite only ever having collisions between two elements.
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Claim 5. Let n = log2N . Then the probability of setting bad within q < N/8 queries is
bounded, with P [bad] ≤ n qN .
Proof. We will bound bad by
P [bad] ≤ P [badB ∨ badB′ ] + P [badA ∨ badA′ ∨ badC ∨ badC′ |¬badB ∧ ¬badB′ ]
Substituting in the bounds from Claim 2 and Claim 4,
P [bad] ≤ q
N
(
5n
7 +
1
2
)
+ q(q − 1)2N2 ≤
q
N
(
5n
7 +
1
2 +
1
16
)
≤ n q
N
,
where we have used that (q − 1)/N ≤ 1/8 for the second inequality, and for the third we
have used that (since q ≤ N/8) either n ≥ 3 or q = 0. 
Combining Claim 1 (Π3rev is identical-until-bad to an ±prp) with Claim 5 (bounding
the probability of bad) completes the theorem.
6 Towards Security with Many Layers
For completeness, let us consider what can be achieved by the Πrev scheme by using many
layers. Since the Πrev3 already provides close to optimal ±prp• security, there is little value
in deriving ever higher security bounds. Instead, we provide an explicit reduction from
many round cases to the smaller versions already studied, demonstrating that the larger
schemes inherit the security of their smaller counterparts.
Lemma 10. The ΠLi construction is no more distinguishable from a random permutation
than ΠLi−1. For any adversary A, there exists adversary B running within similar resources
(up to a constant factor) such that
Adv±prpΠL
i
(A) = Adv±prpΠL
i−1
(B)
and similarly for prp, ±prp• and prp•.
Proof. We will prove just the ±prp case: the other three cases are similar.
Let A be a ±prp adversary against ΠLi , then we construct an adversary B who uses
A to distinguish ΠLi−1. Let Enc and Dec be the encryption, resp. decryption oracle B is
provided with (which may be real or random). B constructs an ideal online permutation
EB (with inverse DB) via lazy sampling, and then simulates a ΠLi encryption oracle with
Π˜Li := EB ◦L◦Enc and corresponding decryption oracle with (Π˜Li )−1 := Dec◦L−1◦DB . To
distinguish the scheme, B runs A, answering all of A’s oracle queries with Π˜Li (resp. (Π˜Li )−1)
then forwards A’s result as his own.
The composition of a random permutation with an online cipher (itself a permutation)
is again a random permutation. So, P [Bpi → 1] = P
[
Api′ → 1
]
. Conversely, if Enc = ΠLi−1,
then Π˜Li = ΠLi , and so P
[
BΠ
L
i−1 → 1
]
= P
[
AΠLi → 1
]
. Taking the difference between
these terms completes the bound.
The whole family of Πrighti constructions can be attacked as follows. If an ideal online
permutation is called with two messages that differ before the final block, the final
ciphertext blocks are independently sampled. Now, if these independent random variables
collide (which is likely to occur roughly every
√
N queries) the right layer will simply add
a common prefix to both messages. From this observation, we build a distinguisher against
Πrighti , following the logic shown in Figure 17.
Andreeva, Barwell, Bhaumik, Nandi, Page & Stam 135
= ! ? ?
= ! $ $→=
$→= = ! $
= = ! $→=
$→= = = !
= = = !
E
L
E
L
E
Key:
= Blocks that are the same across all queries.
! Blocks that are unique across all queries.
? Blocks that may take any value.
$ Blocks that are uniformly sampled.
$→= Blocks that are uniformly sampled, but that we expect to col-
lide if we make enough queries.
Intuition: By making enough queries, we expect that the final blocks,
being uniformly sampled, will collide. If both layers collide at the
same time, we end up building a surprisingly long prefix of collid-
ing blocks, which is easily detectable from the output. Repeating the
process, we can extend the attack to any number of rounds.
1
Figure 17: An attack against Πright3 .
Lemma 11. Consider Πrighti for some i and suppose N ≥ 4. Then for all a ≤ 0, restricting
the prp• scenario to a+i blocks only, and any q ≤ min(Na, N (i−1)/2), Advprp•Π (q) ≥ q(q−1)8Ni−1 .
Proof. Consider the adversary A that requests encryptions of malicious messages of the
form Mt = 〈0〉1||〈t〉a||〈0〉i−1. He will vary t, allowing him up to Na possible queries of this
form (hence the first bound on q). After making his queries, he returns 1 if there were two
queries for which the ciphertexts began with the same i blocks. We claim A successfully
distinguishes Π from an ideal prp.
We first bound P
[
AΠ → 1], by considering the internal variables when encrypting Mt.
During the first round, the first block is identical across all queries, and so encrypts to an
identical value: E(〈0〉1). Since E is an online permutation, the online encryption of the
first a+ 1 blocks must be unique among all queries, since the counter t was. Then, as the
first block is identical throughout, this in turn means the next a blocks must be unique
amongst all queries. Given this unique prefix, the encryptions of the final (i− 1) blocks,
E〈0〉1||〈t〉a(〈0〉i−1) are independently uniformly sampled.
Notice that with precisely the probability of colliding two strings of n random bits,
we have a collision on the final block. Thus, after the first linear layer, in which we shift
the final block to the start, with this same probability there exist queries in which the
first two blocks repeat. Since this output again consists of some repeated blocks, a unique
section and then some arbitrary blocks, we may apply a similar analysis. We do this for
all but the final layer, albeit noting that at the rth layer there are now r repeated blocks
rather than just 1, and i− r arbitrary blocks after the unique section.
So, with the probability of colliding the independent and uniformly sampled final blocks
on each of the (i− 1) internal rounds, there are two queries for which the final block inputs
collide on the first i blocks. As the cipher is online, this leads to an i block collision in the
output, triggering A→ 1. So, P [AΠ → 1] is at least this probability. Since the variables
are independently sampled, this is equivalent to colliding a string of (i− 1) independently
sampled blocks, P
[
AΠ → 1] ≥ q(q−1)4Ni−1 as long as q ≤ √2N i−1 (Lemma 1).
On the other hand, consider P [Api → 1], or the probability of getting a collision on the
first i blocks of output from distinct calls to the ideal cipher. This is upper bounded by
the probability of colliding outputs from the equivalent random function, which is simply
the probability of colliding i random blocks. Thus P [Api → 1] ≤ q(q−1)2Ni .
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Combining these results,
Advprp•Π (q) ≥ P
[
AΠ → 1]− P [Api → 1] ≥ q(q − 1)4N i−1 − q(q − 1)2N i = (1− )q(q − 1)4N i−1 ,
where  = 2/N is small for reasonable parameter sizes. For instance, if N = 2128 as is
commonly the case, then  ≤ 2−127. In any case, applying the hypothesis that N ≥ 4, we
have that  ≤ 1/2 yielding the stated result.
7 Conclusion
We have shown how one can (relatively) efficiently turn an online cipher in a fully fledged
cipher, using two types of mixing layer. To achieve birthday bound security, only two
calls to the online cipher are required, with a linear layer that shifts blocks one step right
achieving prp security, and blockwise reversal leading to a ±prp•. For close to blocksize
security three calls to the online cipher are both necessary and sufficient; a right-shift
mixing layer yields a prp, while reversing achieves ±prp• security. The construction of
online ciphers with beyond birthday bound security itself is still a relativel unexplored
problem [FLLW16], so we hope our work will spur on the study of these versatile primitives.
7.1 Extensions and Reformulations
Our results extend to tweakable online ciphers, forming tweakable ciphers with the tweaks
and bounds of the non-tweak setting (this is mainly an exercise in notation). Similarly,
our proofs can easily be adapted to cover a large set of mixing layers: in particular bit-,
byte-, or word-wise reversal maps can be used in place of blockwise reversal (for any word
size dividing the block size).
Our characterisation of an online cipher (due to Bellare et al. [BBKN01]) is at its most
general. The more specific definition of Rogaway et al. [RWZ12] additionally imposes
a finite amount of state that the online cipher may use. Our results may be recast
into this context by considering the state as a hash of the prefix, for the penalty of an
adversary colliding two states. There are several schemes for converting a true cipher into
an authenticated encryption scheme (e.g. [BR00]), and even to achieve the recent, stronger
goal of robust authenticated encryption [HKR15]. By instantiating these modes with our
construction, one can build an authenticated encryption scheme from an online cipher.
7.2 Further Research
The most important open problem left by this work is the security of the three round reversal
scheme under variable input length attacks, without any additional restrictions on the
lengths of these queries. Resolving this is an important step towards truly understanding
the utility of an online cipher as a base primitive.
All our results are stated relative to an indistinguishability notion. A stronger notion is
the indifferentiability framework [MRH04], where an adversary would also have access to the
online cipher itself (in addition to the cipher one attempts to construct). Indifferentiability
is a much more challenging goal, and existing impossibility results relating to the self-
composition of hash functions [DRST12] appear to extend to the prp case of online ciphers
(curiously, the ±prp situation seems less straightforward). We provide a more detailed
discussion in Appendix A.
From the CMC and EME constructions, it is clear that more involved mixing layers
may reduce the security required of the cryptographic primitive. An interesting question
is whether our work can be extended to show beyond birthday security of a ‘CMCMC’ or
‘EMEME’ like construction. Similarly, how much can we relax the security notion of the
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underlying primitive and still retain good security (this question is relevant for practical
key wrap schemes). Similarly, the requirement of independence between the cipher calls
is probably unnecessary, but removing it leads to a much more complicated setup, itself
necessitating more complex security arguments.
Another question is whether changing the mixing layer will boost security when using
three calls to an online cipher. We conjecture that among blockwise linear schemes, the
scheme Πrev3 is essentially optimal. The level of security achieved by a shift-based scheme
with more layers than blocks remains a tantalizing open problem: conceivably they may
achieve ±prp security.
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A Impracticality of Indifferentiability
The security definitions given in Section 2.2.1 are the standard indistinguishability notions
for symmetric primitives, but are less strong than the indifferentiability notions of Maurer
et al. [MRH04]. In the indistinguishability game, the adversary is provided with oracle
access to the overall construction (and possibly its inverse) or the ideal construction. In
contrast, the indifferentiability game provides the adversary with access to the overall
construction and also the internal primitive, or to the ideal construction and a simulator of
the internal primitive. Thus the indifferentiability setting of the prp security game for the
Π = ΠLi construction instantiated around the online cipher E is ∆
(
pi,S[pi]
E[E],E
)
, where S[·] is a
simulator that provided with access to the permutation pi simulates an online cipher S[pi].
Allowing leakage on the intermediate layers of the construction would allow the
adversary to query the online cipher and overall construction in a somewhat independent
manner, effectively allowing them to play the indifferentiability game.
Dodis et al. [DRST12] showed that the composition of two calls to a hash function is
not indifferentiable from the original hash unless the simulator makes an unreasonably
large number of queries. Broadly speaking, their attack depends on calling the random
oracle to derive a chain of secret values. Then, using two calls to the primitive, this is used
to generate a second,non-overlapping chain. In the real world, to ensure this relationship
holds, any simulator must make a large number of queries, effectively by calculating such
chains themselves.
A similar result can be found when we consider whether the ΠLi construction is
indifferentiable from an ideal cipher (with respect to the online cipher). We assume
L(M)[1] is linearly dependant on M [m] for all M ∈ Σm, since otherwise the scheme is
trivially distinguishable. Then, the distinguisher can simply consider H(M) := L ◦ E(M),
from which (with high probability) the first output block is uniformly sampled. Using this,
he can conduct an equivalent experiment, efficiently building two long chains and forcing
the simulator to link them. Since the simulator is not provided with access to the inverse
permutation, they are unable to invert the chains, leading to a similar analysis.
Let us denote the simulator of E by S[·], with inverse T [·], taking as parameters the
oracles to which it is provided access. Let E[E ] be the ΠLi construction scheme instantiated
with online cipher E , and its inverse be D[D]. Finally, let pi be the ideal cipher, with inverse
pi−1. Then, by the above attack, ∆
(
pi,S[pi]
E[E],E
)
is large (in terms of number of simulator
queries), and corresponds to insecurity under indifferentiability from an ideal cipher.
However, a simulator can defend against this attack with only a small number of queries
if provided with the inverse of the permutation, since he may “unwind” any chains the
adversary created. Thus security of the notion
∆
(
pi , pi−1 , S[pi, pi−1] , T [pi, pi−1]
E[E ] , D[D] , E , D
)
(corresponding to indifferentiability from an ideal cipher under the ±prp game) cannot be
bounded below by this attack. This leaves the rather counter-intuitive situation that a
scheme might be indifferentiable from an ideal cipher with inverse, yet not from an ideal
cipher when not provided with inverse access. Other situations exist, such as a system
providing interfaces for both directions of the online cipher, but only an interface for
encryption queries of the true cipher. Whilst we find it unlikely, these constructions may
yet be proven indifferentiable, but such results are beyond the scope of this paper.
Overall then, there are impossibility results limiting the scope for security under the
indifferentiability game in this area. As such, there are clear limitations for when access
can be provided to the online cipher under the same keying scheme as to the overall
construction. Thus for viable security results, we are limited to the indistinguishability
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setting, meaning any instantiations of the ΠLi construction should be keyed (or tweaked)
independently from interfaces provided to the online cipher.
B Security Definitions
We provide here the formal security notions described in Section 2.2.1. Let E be a cipher
on acting on Σt, a string of blocks of length t. Let E˜ a tweakable block cipher with blocks
Σ and tweakspace T and E˚ an online cipher acting on blocks Σ, all with keyspace K. Then,
the advantage of some adversary A against the security goals of the various objects are as
follows:
Adv prpE (A) := P
[
k←$K : AEk → 1]− P [pi←$ Perm(Σt) : Api → 1]
Adv±prpE (A) := P
[
k←$K : AEk,E−1k → 1
]
− P
[
pi←$ Perm(Σt) : Api,pi−1 → 1
]
Adv tprp
E˜
(A) := P
[
k←$K : AE˜k → 1
]
− P [p˜i←$ Perm(T ,Σt) : Ap˜i → 1]
Adv±tprp
E˜
(A) := P
[
k←$K : AE˜k,E˜−1k → 1
]
− P
[
p˜i←$ Perm(T ,Σt) : Ap˜i,p˜i−1 → 1
]
Adv oprpE˚ (A) := P
[
k←$K : AE˚k → 1
]
− P [˚pi←$ OPerm(Σ) : Ap˚i → 1]
Adv±oprpE˚ (A) := P
[
k←$K : AE˚k,E˚−1k → 1
]
− P
[˚
pi←$ OPerm(Σ) : Ap˚i,˚pi−1 → 1
]
Adv prfF (A) := P
[
k←$K : AFk → 1]− P [$←$ Func(Σt) : A$ → 1]
Adv ±prfF (A) := P
[
k←$K : AFk,F−1k → 1
]
− P
[
$, $−1←$ Func(Σt) : A$,$−1 → 1
]
Adv±tprfF (A) := P
[
k←$K : AFk,F−1k → 1
]
− P
[
$, $−1←$ Func(T ,Σt) : A$,$−1 → 1
]
Note that since the adversary is prevented from making queries to which he already knows
the answer, this definition of an ±prf is equivalent to that presented in the main body
of the paper and much simpler to work with. These are generalised to functions of the
number of queries by defining
AdvxxxW1 (q) := maxAdversaries AA makes q queries
∣∣AdvxxxW1 (A)∣∣ ,
and where appropriate provision for variable input lengths by sampling an element for
each length t. A primitive P is a secure xxx if AdvxxxP (q) is sufficiently small.
